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ABSTRACT

The Representation of Relational Information
in Long Term Memory-

February, 1979

Judy McKinley Brewer, B.A., University of California
M.S., University of Massachusetts,
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Professor James Chumbley

The memorial information used to judge the relative

sizes of two named objects was investigated in a sentence-

verification task in which ordinal and semantic distance
relationships between the judged items were varied orthogonally.

Test sentences were constructed using four sev-

en item subsets of familiar object names drawn from a

pre-experimentally ordered twelve item master list.

Tra-

ditional qualitative analysis mirrored previous findings
that reaction time and errors appeared to be affected by

ordinal attributes of the items on the judged dimension.

Planned contrasts, however, revealed that judgement time
and accaracy were predicted only by the semantic

relationships between the judged items.

(analog)

Use of a tempor-

ary linear memory array was ruled out and an argument was
iv

V

made that analog relational
information was the basis for
these memorial comparisons.
Both an analog referencepoint model and a semantic coding
model were found to be
adequate to describe the comparative
judgement process in
this task.
However, the data suggested that the
descriptions of the memory search and code
generation processes
proposed by the semantic coding model need
refinement.

Constraints on the selection of reference-points
are also
discussed.
The findings provide evidence that
continuous
analog information is available in the long-term
memory

representation and that analog relationships are
utilized
in performing memorial comparisons based on
real-world

knowledge
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
How is it that we know the size, shape, color,

disease resistance, or keeping quality of an apple?
This study concerns the representation of attributes
in human memory.

In particular,

information about

a

it investigates how

certain type of dimension"'" which we

shall refer to as "continuous" is coded in memory.

Human memory is not adapted for exact reproduction of previous events, but has the capability of ab-

stracting the general form of events (Bartlett, 1932)
and of representing them such that we can use them to

act intelligently in the future.

In the natural world,

no two events or objects are exactly the same.

The ab-

stractive nature of memory allows us a flexibility necessary for intelligent operation in this dynamic environment.
Of course,

the abstraction itself is originally formed

of instances,

instances chosen from the real world, and

we do seem to retain some information relevant to individual instances

(Hebb,

1949;

Reed,

1972)

in which we choose, and represent,

.

However, the way

the attributes of the

instances will determine what concepts
may be formed
around them. Thus a complete
understanding of the

means by which we behave rationally,
our cognitive
processing, requires that we understand
the representation of attribute information in memory
(cf.
Arbib,

1972; Minsky, 1975)

ous.

Most physical attributes are perceptually
continuFor instance, the possible colors of
apples
range

from green through yellow to red.

Although we might

symbolize the color attribute of a particular
apple by

calling it "red," we can also say that the "red"
of

a

Russet apple is very different ("more towards the yellow")
from the "red" of a Macintosh.

Likewise, the possible

sizes of apples vary indefinitely between the size of

golfball and the size of a Softball.

a

The size di-

mension is "continuous" because there are an infinite
number of possible magnitudes within any particular range.

When we consider the abstractive nature of human memory,
it is most tempting to assume that these qualities are

also coded in memory and processed in a continuous,
or analog2 form.

There are several reasons to reconsider

this assumption, which will be discussed in terms of

major classes of models proposed to describe the cognitive

processing of continuous dimensional information.

Most of the data relevant to these models
comes
from studies of comparative judgement. These

studies

attempt to specify the nature of the cognitive
representation and processing of certain ordered (or
orderable)
relationships.

Especially, the focus of much experimental

work has been on representation of linear orderings.

Re-

lated tasks include inference, set inclusion,
categorical

judgements and others.

Although we might think that the

real-world applicability of linear ordering studies would
be limited, DeSoto (1961, 1965)

and others have demon-

strated that linear orderings characterize many aspects
of human judgement.

We often act "as if" we were using

universally useful unidimensional lists, even when making

multidimensional judgements.

In the standard comparative

judgement task (cf. Potts, Banks, Kosslyn, Moyer and
Smith, 1978)

,

a subject is presented with a pair of items

and then is asked to select the one which represents more
or less of a particular attribute.

For instance, the

subject might see words or pictures representing a dog
and a horse and be asked to decide quickly which is
er.

small-

Alternatively, the subject may judge the truth of

a stated

comparative relation (e.g., "The dog is smaller

than the horse").

The normal means of measuring this sort

of reasoning is through the reaction time (RT or accuracy

of the subject.

The time required to answer
various

qestions pertaining to the relations,
and the errors in
making these decisions, are examined for
recurrent patterns.
We are most interested in the competencies
humans
have for dealing with the world, in symbolizing
aspects
of the world and in representing concepts
in memory.
Our

ultimate goal is development of
of these competencies.

a

generally useful model

For this purpose, patterns found

across subjects and experimental tasks are most
helpful.

Knowledge of the way humans deal with linear orderings
is,

in itself, useful, but we want to avoid results and

models that are peculiar to arbitrary and/or artificial
settings
In order to be truly viable,

then, any model of

comparative judgement, especially one based on linear
orderings, must speak to other notions of memory and

other tasks.

It must deal with robust effects over

experiments and be extendable, at least inf erentially if
not specifically, to areas such as perception and

general semantic memory.

Secondly, it is preferable that

It be intuitively believable.

3

Parsimony is a primary

factor in credibility; a model which necessitates numerous
ad hoc additions quickly falls from the ranks of serious

consideration.

With these limits, two classes
of models
emerge as generally accepted and
useful.
Models of Memorial Comparison
The two model classes of interest do
not necessari-

ly differ in describing how a
perceived event is stored,
but rather in the conception of how it
is processed
.

"Perceptual" models assume that the representation
used
to make a decision is in a continuous
form, possibly

similar to that of the original percept.

"Linguistic"

models assume that discrete codes, like those of
natural
language, are used to make comparative decisions.

Perceptual models

.

The perceptual models assert that

the information used in the decision process is similar
to that available in the actual physical object as per-

ceived.

Thus information available in

a

continuous form

in the physical world is also available in a continuous

form in memory and is used in that form in processing
(cf

.

Potts et al.

,

1978)

A major impetus in the formation of the models as
they now stand was the discovery of an interesting parallel between perceptual and memorial comparison.

Things

close together on a physical dimension (differing only

slightly in magnitude) are harder to
"see as different"
than things far apart (differing greatly
in magnitude).
For instance, it is easy to select
the dimmer
of two

lights when one is quite dim and one is very
intense.
The decision is far more difficult if both

of the lights

are rather dim, one being only slightly
dimmer than the

other (Welford, 1960)

.

Moyerand Landauer (1967) pointed out that this
effect can be found for memorial distance as well

— the

ease with which we can discriminate between stored di-

mensional values seems to reflect the subjective difference between the magnitudes of such values.

Moyer and

Bayer (1976) titled this the "symbolic distance effect,"
to differentiate it from the case in which the referent

objects or events are actually present.

The effect is

quite robust, and has been obtained for several memorial

continua (e.g., digits, Buckley and Gilman, 1974; animal
size, Moyer,

1973; object size, Paivio,

1975; McKinley,

1975)

Moyer (1973)

first made the suggestion that the

parallel between the perceptual and memorial conditions
was due to an "internal psychophysics " involved in

memorial processing.

While such

a

process seems highly

plausible, it has proven difficult to define in precise

terms.

If confusion processes are
similar, what sort

of internal representation could
support a process

similar to that of perception?

Perceptual models opt for the most likely
candidate and assume that images or analog
codes
are used

and that these are at least second-order
isomorphic^ to
continuous representations.
If the information is treated
directly in its analog form, then processing
could
1)

be similar to "seeing internally," giving
rise to

image-processing models,^ or

2)

not rely on imaginal

representation, necessarily, but use analog codes in
some

alternate way to compute

a

similarity or commonality

judgement.

Paivio (1975) and Kosslyn (1975) have most clearly delineated imagery models.

Kosslyn (1975) described

more clearly what an image might be by describing what
it is not:

it is not a "picture" in that a picture is

concrete, and in that figure-ground perception and

contour sharpening are needed for fundamental interpretation.

Instead, images are preorganized into objects

and their properties, and are meaningful so that we

would not forget a random part as would be possible if
tearing off the corner of a picture.
(1973)

Although Pylyshyn

has leveled some strong arguments against the use

of the image as an explanatory
construct, Kosslyn and

Pomerantz (1977) have published an
eloquent and lengthy
reply, arguing that imagery accounts
of several experimental findings are at least as adequate
as those based on
prepositional representation. The reader
is referred to
both papers for a more detailed discussion
of the imagery
concept.
For present purposes it seems
sufficient
to

present a representative set of assumptions
used in
imagery accounts. The following assumptions
were imple-

mented in

a

computer simulation of imagery by Kosslyn and

Schwartz (1978)
1)

An image is spatial representation like that

underlying the experience of seeing an object during
visual perception.

These images may be generated

from underlying abstract representations, but the

contents of these underlying representations are

accessible only via the generation of
(experienced)
2)

a

surface

image.

Only a finite processing capacity is available

for constructing and representing images.

(Acti-

vated detail is limited.)
3)

Images, once formed, are wholes that may be

compared to percepts in
4)

a

template-like manner.

The same structures that represent spatial in-
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formation extracted during vision also
support images
Many of the same operators (excluding
peripheral
functions) that are used in analyzing percepts
5)

are

also applied to images.
Some subjective support of the image-processing
models lies in the almost universal reports by
subjects in

comparative judgement tasks that they envisioned, imagined, or made a mental picture of the objects to
be com-

pared.

Image-processing models do not directly explain comparative judgement by specifying any particular processes,
but simply state that the mechanisms used in memorial com-

parison are directly parallel to those used in perceptual

comparison of real objects.

These mechanisms, it is as-

sumed, will remain undefined until we understand perception.

The alternatives to the image-processing models,

within the class of perceptual models, rely more heavily
on the continuous quality of the information utilized

than on the representation per se.

Banks

(1977)

has re-

ferred to some of these as "analog continuum" models,
since they often assume that the mental representation

used is a continuum on which items are "placed" for processing.

However, models that claim people represent

10

continuous quantities need not claim
that they place representations on a continuum before making
comparisons.
The defining features of such models
are:
1)

assume image-type representations, but

2)

they do not

they do assume

that the information stored and used for
processing is
continuous.
The term "independent continuous" will
be
used to denote models of this class.
The comparison process such models use is uniform in that "the
information

retrieved at one point (in time) does not
qualitatively
differ from information available at
(Holyoak, 1978).

a

different point"

Information accumulation proceeds over

time, however, allowing increased precision.

Marks'

(1972)

"discriminal dispersion" model was an

early form of such a model, describing the information
used as distributions of subjective stimulus magnitudes.

More recently, Holyoak (1978) has carefully defined and

quantitatively tested a model described earlier by
Jamieson and Petrusic (1975)

.

A form of this reference

point model seems the most reasonable of the independent

continuous class, although

a

model proposed by Moyer and

Bayer (1976) which shares some qualities with the inde-

pendent continuous will be entertained in the final section of this introduction.
The reference point model assumes that subjects com-

pare two stimuli by computing the ratio of the distance

11

of the first stimulus from a reference
point to the

distance of the second stimulus from the
reference point.
This "distance ratio" (or "discrepancy
ratio" as Jamieson
and Petrusic referred to it) accounts for
the
symbolic

distance effect; the farther apart on the continuum
two
stimuli are, the larger (smaller) the computed

ratio will

be and the more quickly the decision may be
reached.

Re-

action time is assumed to decrease monotonically
as the
ratio moves away from one.^

The ratio may be computed on

an analog scale and thus preserve the analog qualities
of the stimuli.

Holyoak (1978) suggests three stages, apart from

encoding and response, which are used in the decision
process:
(in his

1)

a gross categorial stimulus-type evaluation

particular evaluation, identifying the stimulus

as one in which the to-be-compared pair of items lay in

one dimensional direction from

a

reference point, or as

one in which the reference point fell between the items
on the dimension),

2)

assessing the distance from each

comparison digit to the reference point, and
the two derived distances.

2

(e.g.,

comparing

The symbolic distance effect

could be affected by either stages
of measurement

3)

2

or

3

,

but the scale

linear or logarithmic) used in stage

for computing the distances v/ould determine directly

whether subjective magnitude differences would be reflect-

ed in the distance function.

Furthermore, if discrete values are
retrieved, a
direct mental subtraction process
could be used in stage
2 to compute specific distances which
could be compared
in stage 3.
But if an analog representation is
used,

the stage

2

generation and stage

3

comparison processes

might be iterative, generating and comparing
several
sample values.
If the continuous information in the
images or ana-

log codes of perceptual models is converted
to a discrete

form for processing, the line of reasoning
implies that
actual perceptions are also processed in discrete

codes,

since these two processes are seen to be analogous.

A

model making these assumptions is indistinguishable from
Banks' linguistic model (1977).

Linguistic models

.

The semantic coding model proposed

by Banks, Clark, and Lucy (197 5) and elaborated more

fully by Banks (1977)

is the single best example of a

model which assumes that the representation used in

comparative judgement is discrete.

a

The fact that the

model provides an explicit account of memorial comparison
makes it especially attractive.

Although several prepo-

sitional models available (Anderson and Bower, 1973;
Rumelhart, Lindsay, and Norman, 1972; Pylyshyn, 1973)

may well lead to alternate
interpretations, no other
proposal so far extended has fared
well enough to
be considered here (of. Banks,
1977, McKinley, 1975).
The primary assumption of the
semantic coding model
is that discrete categorical
tags are used
in the com-

parison process.

The components of the model
are the

data base, generated codes, and a
set of processing
mechanisms. The data base may be either
temporary data
structures or semantic memory; and these
data bases may
contain continuous information. Banks
(1977) prefers to
limit analog memory representation to
temporary data
structures (Banks, Fujii, and Kayra-Stu^rt
,

1976)

if ad-

mitting it at all, but has not totally ruled
out the
possibility of analog representation in the long-term
data bases.

The generated codes, on the other hand, are

discrete linguistic codes (i.e., categorical tags) in
all
cases.

The processing mechanisms comprise three serial

stages which generate the codes and transform them in

order to make a choice.

Figure

1

outlines the semantic

coding model and will be described in detail in the following discussion.

Note that there is

a

fourth stage "D"

which is the response component and has not yet been explicated by Banks and his colleagues.
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The first stage. A, is an encoding stage
where
discrete codes are derived from sensory
information by

consulting memory.

it also generates similar discrete

codes directly from the memory representation.

These

codes are used by all other stages of processing.

The

second stage, marked B in the diagram, has most
of the
power in controlling processing. This stage utilizes

the

pair of codes generated by the first stage; it
basically
"decides" whether the codes are adequate to distinguish
the stimuli.

This stage has the power to be an active

problem-solver (e.g., to direct the coding stage), but
may in simple instances serve more as

a

passive buffer

(perhaps as a "counter" in the manner of accumulating

information)

.

it is this stage which is responsible for

the semantic distance effect; if items are close together
on a dimension, the codes initially generated to define

them are more likely to be the same and thus to be rejected by this discrimination stage as insufficient for
a choice.
a

Increases in time to make a decision

(RT)

in

difficult comparison reflect time required to accumulate

enough information to generate discriminable codes.
Banks describes this relationship as the availability

principle

:

the closer together two items are, the less

available will be any information which the discrimination process might use to distinguish between them.

An

example provided by Banks (1977) suggests
that items
may be easily distinguished if a third
item which falls
between them on the dimension may be found.
Although
this particular heuristic is not crucial to
the general
viability of the coding model, it is a straightforward
and testable translation of the logic of the
availability

principle and will thus be reviewed in detail later in
terms of the present experiment.

The third stage

(C)

,

and final one of concern

here, matches the generated codes to the code for the

instructions.

The instruction code is assumed to be

in the same form as the codes for the poles of the con-

tinuum;

"pick the largest" is generated as a code of the

form "LARGE," or "pick L+

.

As previously mentioned, the data base

on the diagram in Figure

1

as

1)

(designated

has not been unequivo-

cally defined by Banks (1977), but he has made some

definite suggestions as to the alternatives he would
prefer to entertain.

Recall that two types of data base

are proposed, a temporary one being used for a specific

task and a more permanent semantic memory.
Banks' model of the temporary data base assumes a

strategy in which subjects "place" items on
scale useful for a particular task.

a special

An analog continuum,

such as that described by Shepard, Kilpatric and Cunning-

17

ham (1975, pp. 130-135) would
basically parallel the
type of continuum suggested by
some of the independent
continuous models-with the difference
that codes would
be generated from the representation
rather

than proc ess

ing proceeding directly with
the analog information.

Alternatively, an ordinal "scaffold"

(suggested by

Bower, 1971) might be developed by
placing items on a
scale using their analog attributes, if
appropriate,
and then discarding or otherwise
"forgetting" the

analog relationships while retaining the
representation
of the ordinal relationships.

Although either of these

temporary data structures could represent
interval-scale

information (by frequency, DeSoto and Bosley,
1962; by
spacing, Moyer and Landauer, 1967; by modifiers, Potts,
1974a, 1975; or by strengths of representation or

association on the continuum, Trabasso and Riley, 1975)
it is the ordinal qualities which would be the most pre-

dominant through effects on coding facility

Minsky,

(cf.

1975 for his discussion of symbolic descriptions)

.

Or-

dinal position on the scale would provide the most readi
ly available information for generation of categorical

codes which could be compared.

It is this quality which

makes the temporary structure most useful.

According to the semantic coding model, quantitative attribute information

(analog or discrete)

is not

18

stored at all in semantic
memory, but in most cases
is searched for in an
inferential fashion when it is
needed.
Some support for this contention
comes from
the illustration by Walker
(1975) of flexibility and
contextual effects in our application
of the quantitative attribute knowledge we
possess. Banks suggests
that the search might include
hunting for isolated facts,
possibly image construction, or the
use of heuristic
such as the one previously mentioned
in which the search
is for a third item which can
detail the relation between the two items being judged. We
assume that the

search process can be more precisely
described for any
particular task or circumstance.

Applications and Further Qualification of the Models
There appear to be at least three general
phenomena
found in the majority of comparative judgment and
similar
tasks.

The first of these, the symbolic distance effect,

has already been elaborated in the preceding discussion:
"The time needed to compare two symbols varies inversely

with the distance between their referents on the judged
dimension" (Moyer and Bayer, 1976).

All of the models

considered so far can readily predict this effect.
Perceptual models assume that the representation
has the continuous characteristics of the real objects.

19

perhaps in terms of a second-order
isomorphism, within
the perceptual class are two subgroups.
Image-processing models assume that the
representation is a spatial
representation like an internalized perception.
The
symbolic distance effect is the result of
the same
(unidentified) perceptual mechanisms that
produce the
parallel effect in judgements of actual objects.
Inde-

pendent continuous models are derived from the
assumption
that continuous or analog code information is
used independent of the reliance on an image-type representation.

Reference point models of this independent continuous
subgroup describe the comparison process as the computation of a discrepancy ratio of the distance from each
of the compared items to a common reference point on the

dimension.

The farther apart two items fall on the di-

mension, the more different the ratio is from one and the

easier the decision

— thus

the symbolic distance effect.

The semantic coding model assumes that at least the

processing representation has the discrete characteristics of natural language.

The symbolic distance effect

is predicted by the availability principle as it is

applied to the search process required to generate dis-

criminable codes of the compared items:

the closer the

two items are on the dimension, the more difficult it

will be to find information which places them in separate

categories

Serial-position effects have frequently
been
reported for these tasks. The function
of interest in
this case is the relationship between
reaction

time and

the position of a pair on the scale in
question.

Two

forms of serial position effect have been
reported; a

symmetrical inverse U-shaped function is usually
found
in experiments using finite stimulus sets

(e.g.. Potts,

1972; Banks, 1977), but an asymmetrically bowed in-

creasing (in some cases monotonic) function is often
found for pre-experimentally defined orderings (e.g.,

Moyer and Bayer, 1976; McKinley, 1975)
All models need to

rely on a temporary data

structure to predict a completely bowed inverse U-shaped
function.

In experiments which use a relatively

arbitrary ordering on which the subjects are trained

within the experiment (e.g.. Potts, 1974b; Trabasso,
Riley and Wilson, 1975; Kosslyn, Murphy, Bemesderfer,
and Feinstein, 1977) the bowed serial position function

may be a function of differential associations of the
placed items with their positions on the scale.
(Potts

e_t

al

.

,

1978)

Riley

has suggested such temporary order

ings may be constructed in an ends-inward fashion; this

would result in "easier" retrieval of items nearer the
ends, and accordingly graduated reaction times.

For pre
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experimental (untrained) finite orderings,
the best
explanation of a completely bowed function
involves

differential end-term processing.

In the repeated test

situations that are almost requisite when using
any
finite stimulus set, the end-anchors can each
become

associated with a particular response and present

a

"quick-exit" processing situation when they appear in
the stimulus pair.

Several reports have discussed the

implications and explanatory limits of the end-term
strategies (cf. McKinley, 1975; Riley and Trabasso, 1974;

Holyoak and Walker, 1976).

For the purpose of the pres-

ent consideration it is only important to note that data

usually show

a

end-term cases.
as well,

decreased or absent distance effect for

End-term strategies have been blamed,

for bowing in what appear to be otherwise

monotonic or nearly monotonic functions.

The characteris-

tic of immediate interest is that such functions are

asymmetric; sometimes they are, in addition, monotonic.

Asymmetric serial functions have been found for
the special finite sets of digits, 0-9

(Moyer and

Landauer, 1973; Fairbank and Capehart, 1969) and of al-

phabetic letters (Lovelace and Snodgrass, 1971).

In

these cases, the asymmetry is assumed to reflect the form
of the underlying scale.

mic

'

If the number scale is logarith-

(Banks and Hill, 1974), comparison of small digits
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will yield faster reaction
times than will compari.-son
of large digits when compared.
Asymmetric
functic
Lons

have been interpreted by Moyer
and Bayer (197 6) and
McKinley (1975) to reflect scanning
processes, and by
Woocher, Glass, and Holyoak (1978)
as the interactive
result of a directionally-biased scan
and a symmetrical
effect of positional discriminability
(i.e., differential
discriminability of item positions on an
internal array,
of. Crowder, 1976; Trabasso and
Riley, 1975).

Serial position effects, then, have
primarily

been interpreted as evidence of an internalized
linear
array, perhaps a scaffold as Bower (1971)
suggested but
not necessarily purely ordinal; and frequently
the serial

position functions have been interpreted as scan functions as well.

The third effect is actually a special form of
the second.

The semantic-congruity effect involves an

interaction between the form of the question or instruction and the level of the stimuli on the continuum being
judged.

A comparison can be made more quickly if the

items compared are from the end of the scale consistent

with the form of the comparative term, i.e., it is easier
to decide which of two small items is smaller and which

of two large items is larger than, for instance, which
of two small items is larger.

Sometimes this is

a

com-

plete "crossover" effect (the ease of
the alternate
decisions completely reverse at opposite
ends of the
scale).

For other data and continua

,

one form of the

question may always seem to have a certain
advantage,
but the advantage may not be so pronounced
at the opposite
end of the scale.
The congruity effect (as it will be referred to
in the remainder of this paper, although
there are

congruity effects other than the semantic

— size

congruity

is one)

is very difficult for some models to explain.

It was,

in fact,

the main premise on which Banks and his

colleagues developed the semantic coding model.

Image-

processing models have the greatest problem predicting
any change in the pattern of reaction times with the
form of the question.

For a finite set, it can be

assumed that the congruity effect is just another way
of presenting either of the serial position effects

described above, and that the explanation is essentially
the same.

If the subject begins scanning at the end of

an internalized ordering or scaffold, the items nearest

that end will be reached most quickly.

If the additional

assumption is made that the subject begins at the end

designated by the question, the interaction of the congruity effect may be predicted; when asked "Which is
larger?," the subject begins at the large end of the

scale to look for the items and finds
large items most
easily.
There has been no reason to disbelieve
this

account for finite sets; however, Banks
and Flora (1977)
have recently demonstrated the congruity
effect
for

infinite sets as well.

effect cannot be

m

an infinite set design, the

the result of processing on a scaffold

or other associative structure built up
during repeated

testing of items.

End-item associations are also ruled

out

Kosslyn and his colleagues

C1977)

have suggested

the concept of "recalibration" as an explanation for

congruity effects in imaginal comparison.

The idea of

recalibration is that we set our perceptual mechanisms
for a certain range of percepts and that we must readjust

this range if it is inappropriate.

If we compare the

largeness of images in terms of the amount of space
filled, we might set a criterion for accumulated "filled

space" which is higher for large-range images than for
small images.
a

This is easiest to understand in terms of

"frame" in which the image is constructed; we would

make a large frame when asked "how large?" and
one when asked "how small?."

a

small

If the image turned out

to be a small one in a large frame, the sampling process

would not be adequately sensitive.

We would be required

to recalibrate the frame and this process would use time.

This is an expectancy effect in
which the instruct:lions
define what is to be expected.
Banks and Flora (1977)
have reported results which question
the adequacy of
this explanation.
They used a task in which instructions
were delayed until after the stimuli
were presented
(in fact they tried several forms
of the
task)

there could be no expectancy.

so

The data demonstrated

convincingly that the semantic congruity effect
was unchanged.
It is not clear how the "frame"
explanation
could deal with this data.
The independent continuous models represented by
the reference point model fare far better.

The expec-

tancy hypothesis would, of course, have applied to
this

model as well; one simply chooses the reference point

designated by the comparative term in the question.
Alternatively, however, it is possible to simply select
that reference point which is nearest to the items being
judged.

This alternative readily predicts the congruity

effect and it is not dependent upon expectancy (although
the point surely might be selected "ahead of time" if
the situation made is feasible)

The semantic coding model, of course, has a ready

explanation of the congruity effect.

The effect is the

result of processing in the third stage, where the
generated codes are matched with the code for the instruc-
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tions.

If the generated codes are LARGE
and LARGE+

which would usually be the case if both
items came
from the same generally large end of

the scale, and the

instruction code was LARGE+ (pick the largest)
the match to the instructions would be
easy.

ever, the instruction code were SMALL+
est)

,

then

if, how-

(pick the small-

for the same set of stimulus codes, the
matching

stage would have to transform the stimulus codes
to match
the instructions

(the transformation is arbitraily

assumed always to go in this stimulus-to-instruction
direction).

Thus LARGE/LARGE+ would be transformed to

SMALL+/SMALL before the match could be effected and time

would be consumed.

The closer the items are to the

named end of the scale, the more likely that they will
be coded in a "matchable" fashion.

To summarize, all three models can predict the

symbolic distance effect, and account for serial position

effects as described; however, the image-processing model
runs into very serious difficulty with the semantic-

congruity effect while the two alternate models predict
the effect rather simply.

There are several reasons for rejecting the image-

processing subclass besides this one (albeit rather significant) problem.

Several recent experiments provide

additional negative evidence.

First, Holyoak (1977)

reported a recent set of experiments
attempting to
elucidate the function of imagery in mental

size com-

parison.

He found that although subjects could
utilize

images when instructed to do so, there was
no evidence
that subjects needed to use imagery if not
asked to do
so, even when comparing very similar
items.
a number of

Secondly,

researchers have obtained symbolic distance

and congruity effects for "non-perceptual"
dimensions.

Holyoak and Walker (1976) demonstrated the effects
for
semantic adjective qualities such as good - fair dimensions, Friedman

(in press)

reproduced the evaluative

dimension effect in both finite and infinite set paradigms (ruling out ordinal temporary data-base explanations which might be used to "back up" the imaginal

process)

,

and Kerst and

Howard

(1977)

extended the

effect to rankings of animals, countries, and cars on

both concrete (perceptual) and abstract (non-perceptual)
dimensions.

In light of this evidence compounded with

the semantic-congruity difficulties, we will discontinue

consideration of image-processing models for the time
being.

It is only fair to add that both Kosslyn, Murphy,

Bemesderfer, and Feinstein (1977) and Paivio (1978) have

proposed dual-process models (imagery and verbal codes)

which answer most of the above concerns.

However, in
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the interest of parsimony, it seems
unwise to propos(56
dual processes if a single process model
will suffi.-ce
to explain the data.
It is important to point out that
discarding the

notion of imagery as necessary for comparative
judgement
by no means indicates a belief that it does
not occur
at all.

The many phenomena reported by Shepard and his

colleagues (e.g., Shepard and Feng, 1972; Shepard and
Chipman, 1970) are alone sufficient to defend the concept
of the image as a viable construct.

A reasonable sug-

gestion has been offered by Holyoak (1977)

:

perhaps in

the comparison task the formation of images is a

tangential and effortless process which proceeds in
parallel with semantic thought, but which is neither used
nor needed.

Since the image is a "surface" representa-

tion and easily described as well, subjects report its

presence even when not manipulating it directly.

In

any case, until there appear to be compelling reasons to

reconsider, image-processing models of comparative judge-

ment will not be dealt with further.
The two models holding the most promise are the

reference point model (an independent continuous model)
and the semantic coding model

(a

linguistic code model)

The data of the experiment to be reported aid in assess-

ing these models for their generality
and usefulness.

The factor which most obviously differentiates
the models presently considered in this
report is the

ordinal/interval (discrete/analog) form of information
in the representation used for comparative
judgements

which subsequently produce the symbolic distance
effect.
The experiment was designed to assess the relative
contributions of analog and ordinal information to these
decisions.

This was and still is an important distinc-

tion between the proposed processes.
In order to evaluate the contributions of these

variables in a direct way, stimuli were selected in

which the ordinal and semantic relationships between
items could be manipulated independently.

Lists which

differed in the ordinal distance or real-world (analog)

distance between similar items were constructed.

For

instance, in the lists dog^-bear^-elephant^ and dog2-

elephant2-whale2

/

semantic distance between dog and

elephant is equivalent, but the ordinal distance is greater in the first list, as they are separated by another

item on the list.

Dog^^-bear^^ and dog2-elephant2

^

on the

other hand present equal ordinal distances, but the analog
(real-world) difference is greater for dog2-elephant2

Finally, some pairs had equivalent distance, but different

ordinal (serial) position in the list.

For example, in
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mouse3-dog3-bear3 and dog^-bear^-elephant^

,

dog-bear

differs only in serial position—
having equivalent
ordinal and analog distances. Thus,
for any particular
pair, judgement times from different
lists could
be

compared to evaluate effects of ordinal
and analog
distance and ordinal position separately.
Additionally, looking back over the reports

produced since the experiment was conducted and
with
the data to be presented in hand, we could
see that

there were more specific implications of the presently

interesting model classes which could be examined.
Some assumptions can be made which, though not yet

delineated formally, follow logically from the models as
presented.

It will be argued that the semantic coding

model predicts that strong ordinal effects will appear
in comparative judgement mean RT for some tasks even if

information is drawn from
wit:

a

long-term data base.

To

the semantic coding model proposes that a code is

generated for each item as it is considered in
parison.

a com-

For the sake of clear discussion, we will assume

that only a limited number of codes

(e.g.,

small, small+) are used for this task.

large, large+,

(To assume a

greater number of codes would not substantially alter
the arguments.)

Secondly, we will assume that once a

particular code is generated for an item, that same code

is more likely to be regenerated
than other codes for

that item.

This may be conceived in terms of attach-

ing a "label" or activating a particular
connection or

whatever.

The point of importance is that the probabil-

ity of regenerating the code previously selected
for an

item is increased each time it is selected for
that
item.

Finally, we assume that there is residual

activation of information previously accessed.

After

repeated testing, given these assumptions, the probability

with which a particular discrete code is likely to be

generated for an item will directly reflect the ordinal

relationship of that item to the other items in the
list.

Items nearer the ends of the lists, for example,

will be more likely to "produce" Large+ or Small+ codes.
In this

way,

ordinal information might be the most

easily accessible discrete information in long-term

memory as well as in

a

(if one is constructed)

temporary
.

data base scaffold

This does not imply that

a

"long-term memory linear array" is constructed, but only
that discrete information retrieved from long-term memory

will most likely be similar to that derived from

a

temporary linear memory array.

According to the reference-point model, no particular predictions are made concerning repeated-testing
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effects.

It is possible, of course, that
sampled

analog information would be "more excited"
than other
possible samples, but it does not seem that
these

samples could reflect the ordinal list
relationships
in any direct way as is the case with
discrete codes.

To summarize this argument, the semantic coding
model, as interpreted, predicts that in any
repeated-

test paradigm, ordinal list relationships will be

reflected in the symbolic distance effect whenever discrete information is accessed for comparative judgement.
This is true even if long-term memory is used for that

judgement.

The present experiment was originally designed to

assess the relative contribution of semantic and ordinal

distance effects.

It is now apparent that the semantic

coding model predicts that ordinal effects must be present in a repeated-set paradigm.

An absence of semantic

distance effects creates difficulties for both models.
Present Experiment
The experiment used four seven-term size-order ings

chosen from a single list of twelve names of familiar
objects.

Thus no experimental training was required in

using the orderings in a sentence-verification paradigm,

parallel to that of McKinley (1975)

,

in which reaction

times and errors were recorded.

The four lists were

constructed such that ordinal separation
and semantic
distance could be examined orthogonally.
a means of
evaluating the serial position effect

was also included.

Each of the items was tested repeatedly
over a two-day
period.

CHAPTER

II

METHOD
Subjects
A total of thirty-two
subjects served in the
experiment. They were undergraduates
who participated
for experimental credit
toward course grades or to

complete a course requirement.

Each subject partici-

pated in one fifty-minute session
on each of three
consecutive days. Only the first two
days' data are
of immediate interest, since
the third day constituted
a separate experiment.

Apparatus
Stimuli were presented on a video
monitor controlled by a PDP-8E computer.
Reaction times were
obtained and recorded under program control
using a

response console with two trigger-switches and

button which could be illuminated.

a

central

The trigger-switches

were labelled "True" and "False" appropriately.
Materials
A twelve-item list, the ten-item "objects" list

used in McKinley's

(1975)

previous study with two new
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items added, was used to construct
four separate sevenitem lists with common elements.
The two additional
items were chosen from a list
generated by six subjects
who were asked to nam.e all the items
they could think
of which were household objects
larger than a briefcase
and smaller than a bicycle.
The names of all the items
were printed on cards, one to a card, including

McKinley's original ten items.

The same subjects were

then asked to order all the cards according to
the
size"^ of the

items named and the two most consistently

placed new items were selected and added to the list.
The twelve-item list is indicated in Table

1,

along with

the four seven-item lists constructed from it.

Four seven-item test lists were chosen such that
two distance measures, semantic distance and ordinal

separation, could be examined independently.

In general,

single ordinal steps in List A represented smaller

semantic distances than did ordinal steps in Lists B,
C,

or D.

Since the items were the same for all lists,

semantic distance was equated while ordinal separation
and serial position were varied.

In addition, checks

for the confounding effect of overall serial position
of a pair were included.

The major critical items for the analysis

from positions

base list.

4,

6,

and

8

v/ere

those

in the original twelve-item

Note that List A constituted

a

complete series
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1.

Pin

2.

Toothpick

3.

Razorblade

4.

Matchbook

5

Teaspoon

.

6.

Lightbulb

7.

Brick

8

Briefcase

9.

11.

Typewriter (new item)
Television (new item)

12.

Bicycle

10.

Position

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

B

1

2

4

6*

8

10

11

C

2

4#

6

8

10

11

12

D

1

3

5

7

9

11

12

*

Insert item

7

on Day

3

#

Insert item

5

on Day

3

Numbers refer to position of items
in the original twelve-item list.

Table

1:

Structure of the twelve-item list and the four
test lists constructed from it.

(McKinley's,

1975, Objects list plus two new items.)
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of items
6

3

through

9

of the base list.

were two ordinal steps apart, as
were

List B, these items were adjacent.

Thus items
6

and

8

.

4

and

m

In List C, these

items were again adjacent, but the
serial position of
the items was altered such that pairs
including items
4,

6,

and 10 appeared at earlier positions in
the

8,

serial order.
item

Furthermore, pairs in List C which included

had the same initial serial position as correspond-

4

ing pairs in List A.

List D was a control list, providing

adjacent-pair (single-step) situations for pairs 3-5,
5-7,

and 7-9.

Note that this was

a

second situation

(comparable to List B, but with different semantic
items)

in which a single ordinal step in List A repre-

sented less semantic distance than the equivalent step
in the alternate list.

The seven-term orderings allowed 21 unique pairings
of items for each list.

The test statements were

constructed from these in the form "A is smaller than
The comparative "smaller" was always used.

B"

There was

no interest in checking for a congruency effect as it

had already been demonstrated for the objects list in
the similar task used by McKinley

(1975)

.

The term

"smaller" was selected for use because it produced more

stable data in that study than the question using
"larger

"
.

.
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The pre-test materials were four sets
of seven

cards each, one set for each list, with
the name of a
different item from the list printed on each
card next
to a line drawing of the object.
Each subject saw only
one of the sets (lists)

Procedure
The subjects were run individually in three sessions,

each consisting of a practice block of trials and eight

data-collection blocks.
For the pre-test, each subject was given

a

set of

cards and asked to put them in order according to size
of the items indicated.

S/he was allowed to do this in

any manner (laying them out, putting them in
etc.)

or direction

a

stack,

(largest to smallest or vice versa).

The order and manner were recorded.

If more than three

items of the subject's ordering conflicted with the

chosen ordering, the subject was dismissed from the

experiment with appropriate credit.

If three or fewer

items conflicted, the experimenter pointed out the

disagreement

(s)

and asked the subject if s/he agreed

that the ordering being used for the experiment was

reasonable one.

If the subject agreed,

a

the cards were

randomized and the subject was asked to order them again.
If agreement was not reached on this trial,

the subject
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was dismissed with appropriate
credit.

if agreement

was reached, the cards were reshuffled
and the subject
was asked to reproduce the order to
a criterion of
two consecutive correct orderings.

No subject was run

more than three pre-test trials, and no
subject was
used who did not agree that the ordering was
or natural one for him or her.

whose error rate rose above 5%
or Day

2)

a

rational

In addition, any subject
(17

errors on either Day

1

on the data-collection trials was dismissed

from the experiment and given appropriate credit.

Only

two subjects exceeded the error limit and had to be

dismissed.

The subjects dismissed were from the C and

D list groups and each made IS total errors.

There was a practice block of 10 statements ran-

domly selected from the possible set at the beginning
of each day's testing.

In addition, data from the first

two trials of each data-block were discarded and the

test statements replaced in the pool.

Each block of trials included one presentation of
each of the twenty-one pairs at each truth value.

The

forty-two resulting test sentences were randomized within
a trial block.

For each trial, a statement appeared on

the screen and remained there until the subject responded

"true" or "false" by pulling the corresponding trigger.

Subjects were instructed to respond as quickly as possible
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without making errors.

At the end of each block, a

central button lit up and the subject's
mean RT and
error rate appeared on the screen to
assist him/her in
monitoring his/her performance. The subject
pressed
the lighted central button to continue
to the next
block.

Eight subjects were tested with each list; half
used their dominant hand for the "True" response
and
half used their non-dominant hand.

List (A-D)

Hand (Dominant or Non-dominant for True)

,

,

formed eight

independent groups for between-subject analysis.
(1

or

2)

,

and

Day

Truth Value (True or False) and Pair (1-21)

were within-subject factors.

CHAPTER

III

RESULTS

Mean correct reaction times were
calculated over
the eight data collection blocks for
each of the fortytwo pairs for each subject for each of
the first
two

days.

The number of correct responses was calculated

similarly.

a five-factor analysis of variance was

performed on each of these measures with List, Hand,
Subject within List-Hand, Day, Truth Value and Pair as
factors.

As was expected, given previous data, there

was no effect of the dominant or non-dominant hand being
used for the "True" response, so it was possible to

collapse the analysis across the Hand factor to gain
power.

Anova results reported will be from the collapsed

analysis.

The average error rate was very low, 3.25%.

All error analyses and results paralleled those for re-

action time, and the conditions that were slower also had
more errors, thus belying a speed/accuracy trade-off.
The specific error analyses will not be reported, but

error data noted when it does not parallel RT

Analysis of Variance Results

Main interest was in the List and Day main effects
and in the List by Pair interaction.

Appendix A
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summarizes the results of the full
analysis.

The

analysis of variance provided a general
look at overall
list, response bias, and practice effects.
Since the
ordering of the individual pairs for such an
analysis
was logical but necessarily arbitrary,
the expected main
effect of pair was examined more closely by
inspecting

qualitative patterns in the data and through specific
planned contrasts of particular pairs.
Table

2

shows the average reaction times and per-

centage errors for each list.
was significant

(F

(3,28)

The main effect of List

= 3.92,

p

<

.05).

Since the

lists were the same length, list differences should be

attributable to item differences and differences in
semantic distance between items.

Of course, when the

average semantic distance between items in a list increases, its range increases.

Range differences were

very slight in this experiment; List A's range was the
only one noticeably smaller.
197 5)

Previous studies (McKinley,

have indicated that range was probably

at best.

a

weak factor
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List

A

B

Mean

1558.00

1126.78

Percent
Errors
Table

2:

2.73

1533.73

2.93

3.08

1255.65
2.88
^.oo

Average reaction times and percentage errors
by
list.

Lists B and C varied in only one item, so that the

apparent difference between them is difficult to assign.
Since the main effect of List, even with items of totally

different classes (animals, balls, fruits, and objects)
was not very strong in McKinley's

(1975)

study, item

differences would not be expected to account for much
variance.

Moreover, List

D,

with an almost entirely

different set of items, had an average reaction time
very close to that for List

B.

It seems reasonable to

suppose, then, that the List C average RT reflects a

maverick variable to be explicated through qualitative
analysis
The difference between the List A reaction time

and those for Lists B and D may have been produced by a

general slowing of the RT's for List A.

This would be

expected if the Symbolic Distance Effect was largely
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controlled by semantic distance.
(range)

Overall semantic dista nee

could have been a factor, but more
compelling

is the fact that the average semantic
distance between

pairs was less for List A than for any of
the other three
lists, though ordinal distances were obviously
the same.

The general slowing of reaction times for List
A would

support the hypothesis of strong semantic components
in
the Symbolic Distance Effect.

Note that increasing the

absolute size differences (semantic differences)

decreases RT but does not significantly change errors;
this has been demonstrated by Potts
and Bayer

(1976).

(1974a)

and by Moyer

It is as if subjects were changing

criterion to keep error rate constant and thereby
lowering RT.

This is a between list speed-accuracy

tradeoff.
Similarly, the significant List by Pair Interaction
(60,560)

(F

= 2.47,

p

<

.05)

indicated

a

strong semantic

component, since pairs in the analysis were defined by

ordinal locations.

If pairs varied across lists,

it

had to be due to the different semantic components of
the pairs.
The significant Day main effect
p

<

.05)

faster

(F

(1,28)

= 121.3,

evidenced the fact that subjects were much
(approximately 500 msec.) on the second day.

Day

did not interact in an important way with anything except
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Truth Value.

This was due to people learning about

the large end-anchor as discussed below.

Qualitative Patterns

Qualitative analyses generally showed that the
patterns of data normally referred to in discussions
of
the Symbolic Distance Effect, serial position effects,

and end-anchor effects were replicated for this study.

Figure

2

illustrates the distance effect in the

data averaged over days.

Mean reaction time was inversely

related to the distance (number of ordinal steps) between
terms in a pair, decreasing as the number of ordinal
steps between terms increased.

The slopes for all lists

are similar, with the intercepts for Lists A and C

reflecting the aforementioned overall increases in RT.
Figures

3,

4,

and

illustrate serial position

5

curves very similar to the asymmetrically bowed curves

frequently found in comparative judgement tasks.

The

figures demonstrate the effects for pairs of stepsize
(adjacent pairs),
the lists.

2,

and

3

1

respectively within each of

Even with end-anchor pairs eliminated, 10

out of the 12 best-fitting lines had slopes greater than
zero.

This proportion of positive slopes was significant

by a simple sign test

(Z

=

2.07, p

<

.02).
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Figures
effects.

and

graphically demonstrate
end-anchor
Note that these curves
are plotted in
6

7

the sa.e

manner as the distance
effect curves of Figure
2 except
that only anchor pairs are
included.
Distance between
the anchor item and the
other member of the pair
increases along the abscissa.
Most of these end- term
functions show a decreased or
absent effect of distance,
being more flattened than the
comparable curves of
Figure 2 and indicating
differential processing of
pairs containing end terms.
The effect of an end-anchor
strategy was most evident in both
the "true" and
"false" curves of Figure

6

for the small anchor.

This

might be expected, since the
comparative was always
"smaller" (vide Woocher, Glass and
Holyoak, 1978).

For "true" pairs, those in which
the small anchor
occurred on the left (i.e., "A (anchor)
is smaller than
X"), the curves are especially
flattened, indicating a

universally quick acceptance.

Moving to Figure

7,

we

see that for "false" pairs, in which the
large anchor

appeared on the left and presented

a

quick-reject

opportunity, the curves are again nearly flat.

presents the most ambiguous support for

a

List D

large-anchor

effect.

The end-anchor plots also revealed the source of
the problematic difference in the average reaction time
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for List C, compared to the
other lists.

Referring again

to Figure 6, note that the
response time for small-

anchor true sentences is not
the same across lists.
This is remarkable, since it
supposedly reflects a

standard quick-exit response

(cf.

Potts,

1972,

1973;

Trabasso and Riley, 1975; McKinley,
1975; Moyer and
Bayer, 1976).
it is logical to assume that
the differences between these flat-response
times reflect overall
response-time imbalances between the subject
groups
used for each list.
The slowing of List C is attributable
to uninteresting subject differences.
Table

3

presents the average reaction times for

the four lists and the differences between
those RTs
The second row of figures indicates the
average small

anchor response times and the differences between
those
response times.

The third row shows the average list

RT differences which remain unaccounted for by the

differences in quick-response anchor times.

This last

row indicates that approximately 150 to 200 msec, of
the List A RT difference remains unaccounted for by the

above analysis, adding credence to the interpretation
of that difference as attributable to the closer

semantic spacing of that list.

Finally, as expected,

all subjects in this task reported, as in previous
tasks, that they believed they had used imagery.

Some
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subjects reported "overlaying"
the images and some
reported creating adjacent images.
One subject reported
not requiring imagery on the
second day, but could
not describe how he did perform
the task.
Contrasts
The cardinal concern of this study
was the
relative impact of semantic versus
ordinal attributes
on judgement time.
To examine these influences of

semantic distance, ordinal position, and
step size
(ordinal distance) more systematically,
three major

contrasts were performed using only those pairs
in

which these factors varied orthogonally.

Two forms

of score standardization were employed in order
to

confirm the accuracy of the results.

The contrasts

were performed separately for true and false sentences,

making a total of six contrasts for each type of
standardization; accordingly, the rejection level was
set at

=

.01 for each contrast,

thus holding the

below .10 as suggested by Scheffe (cit. Myers, 1972,
pp.

360-364).

Table

4

lists the pairs and scores used

in the contrasts.

First all scores were adjusted individually for
each subject by his or her estimated quick-response
time.

Each subject's average small-anchor true response
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time

(the average of the six pairings

(1,2 through 1,7)

in which the small anchor
appeared on the left) was

subtracted from each of his or her
reaction time scores
for "True" sentences.
The average large-anchor
false

reaction time (the average of the six
pairings (7,6
through 7,1) in which the large anchor
appeared on the
left) was likewise subtracted from the
reaction times

for "False" sentences.

This was done separately for

each day's scores, and the results combined.

Semantic distance demonstrated

a

reliable effect

with the predicted difference tested against zero for
both true and false response times

(t

(1,28)

true pairs; t (1,28) = 3.12, false pairs).

= 2.95,

This means

that with ordinal position and stepsize held constant,
the semantic distance represented within a pair signifi-

cantly affected reaction time.

This is evident in the

individual pairs of "anchor adjusted" scores listed in
Table

4

for the semantic distance contrast.

(Only "True"

scores are indicated in the table, false scores were

essentially similar.)
and

3

For instance, list positions

2

are ma tchbook- teaspoon and matchbook-lightbulb in

Lists A and C respectively.
813 and 471 msec.

:

The adjusted scores are

with all ordinal variables held

constant the analog differences in size were reflected
in the reaction times.

This relationship holds for
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each of the nine simple
comparisons used; the pair
with
greater semantic distance
invariably has a shorter RT
and the magnitude differences
are relatively consistent.
The ordinal position evaluation
showed no significant effects. With semantic
distance and stepsize held
constant, serial position in the
list had
no effect.

Again, examining individual paired
sets supports the
overall contrasts:
only three of five differences
are in the predicted direction and
these are small.

Finally, the stepsize contrasts showed an
ambi-

guous effect in which the contrast for false
sentences
was not significant, but for true sentences
there was
a

negative effect of stepsize

(t

(1,28)

= -3.93).

This would indicate that items closer together in
the
list were actually easier to discriminate than those

with greater ordinal separation.

Besides being totally

contrary to intuition for this sort of

a task,

this

result was the reverse of all previously-reported
findings

(Potts, et

al

.

,

1978).

If we recall that the List A average reaction time

was approximately 150 to 200 msec, slower than accounted
for by the quick-response estimates, it becomes apparent

from Table

3

that pairs from List A could bias a

contrast by virtue of the reaction-time "advantage."
By the necessary structure of the contrasts, the List A
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"advantage" may have biased the
semantic distance
contrast toward significance, and
the stepsize contrast
away from significance.
it would have had no effect
on
the ordinal position evaluation,
as no pairs from List A
are included in that contrast.
order to verify the
obtained results, a second set of
contrasts was performed
using scores adjusted for each
subject's individual mean
reaction time.
This had not been chosen as the
initial
adjustment measure because it effectively
obliterates
list differences; however, it provides
the most conservative assessment of semantic distance and
stepsize

m

effects
There is a crossover in the appropriateness of
the two forms of score standardization, as is
indicated
in the column headings for Table 4.

The anchor adjust-

ment method was "too conservative" for the stepsize
evaluation, biasing the contrast against significance.

For the semantic distance evaluation, however, adjusting
for subject means

(including the "extra" List A RT)

the more conservative measure.

is

The means adjustment

(removing list effects) could artificially remove a real

reaction time difference for the semantically closer
items of List A.

Results of the "means-adjusted" contrasts were as
before, except that the "negative effect of stepsize"

disappeared-it was obviously

a spurious result.

Examining the individual pairings
in Table
of the

4

shows that

comparisons were in the predicted
direction,
but the greatest magnitude in
these differences is only
85 msec.
Effects in the semantic evaluation
were often
double that magnitude.
Semantic distance remained
significant (t (1,28) = 3.23, true pairs;
=
3

4

t

(1,28)

2.9;

false pairs) even in this conservative
test, and no
effect of stepsize or ordinal position
was statistically

evident.

CHAPTER

IV

DISCUSSION

Ordinal properties of items in naturally

ordered lists have no effect on the difficulty of

performing memorial comparisons of those items.

When

semantic distance, ordinal separation and serial position were totally unconfounded in the comparative

judgement of object sizes, only semantic distance
was found to have a significant effect on reaction
time.

This was found in

a

repeated test paradigm

using a finite set of stimulus items.

It will be argued

below that these results firmly establish the necessity
for a mode of memorial comparison in which analog re-

lationships are not only stored in memory, but reflected
in the information we use to make comparative decisions.

Although the present results do not rule out the
use of a linear array for decision-making in some com-

parative tasks, they do suggest that data patterns

previously accepted as evidence for ordinal effects
should be examined in more detail.

Data from this ex-

periment, plotted in the standard fashion, showed patterns

which have commonly been interpreted as evidence of serial

position and ordinal separation factors
systematically
affecting reaction times. Many researchers
(Meyer and

Bayer, 1976; McKinley, 1975; Banks,
1977; Woocher

,

Glass,

and Holyoak, 1978) have interpreted
serial position

functions, in particular, as evidence of the
use of an
internalized linear array.
in some cases, they have also
been the basis for the proposal of a scanning
process.

While linear arrays almost surely form the data base
for
some memorial comparison tasks, their construction and
use may not be as common as has been claimed.
In the present task, subjects were exposed to the

same seven stimulus items repeatedly over the course
of two days.

Apart from the pretest ordering and the

practice trials at the beginning of the day and before
each block, a subject made

a

comparative decision about

any one item against the others in the list 96 times per
day!

If subjects did not form and use a linear

"scaffold" in this situation, and they did not, we cer-

tainly must be cautious in proposing that such scaffolds
are likely to be used in other circumstances.

One

probable exception is the case of experimentally taught
orderings, especially if the orderings are arbitrary and

relatively meaningless outside the experimental context.
In such a case, there seem to be few reasonable ways for
a subject to efficiently encode and memorize the trained
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relationships.

Even in such cases as these, it
appears

to be imperative to "double check"
qualitative analyses

with quantitative evaluations (e.g., Woocher
and Holyoak, 1978).

,

Glass,

At the very least, we must reexamine

the relationship between processes of
retrieval and com-

parison in tasks using orderings learned within
the experiment and those using orderings based on pre-experimental knowledge; the correspondence may be more tenuous
than we had presumed.
The present results also suggest some specifica-

tions and/or modifications of the long-term data struc-

tures and related processes for the reference point and

semantic coding models.
The lack of evidence for an effect of serial posi-

tion of items in the list has direct implications for
the reference point models as described by Jamieson and

Petrusic (1975) and Holyoak (1978).

It might be assumed

that the end-anchors for the lists would also serve as
the natural reference points for computing discrepancy

ratios; had this been in fact true, however, it would

have produced a negative effect of serial position for
the selected pairs in which it was possible to evaluate

the effect independently.

The identical items in Lists

B and C would have been evaluated against a smaller end-

term in List B than in List C, giving the latter com-

parison the reaction time advantage.

This is exactly

the reverse of the prediction made
in terms of ordinal

position.

Since there was no effect, in either
direction, of serial position for these
pairs, the end term
could not have served as the reference
point.
However,
if a consistent reference point
outside the list were

selected, identical pairs in the two lists
would have

produced identical discrepancy ratios, regardless
of the
ordinal position of the pairs. The most interesting
aspect of this interpretation derives from the fact
that list was a between-subject variable; the implication
is that different subjects selected similar reference

points.

There is reason to believe that certain "typical"

representations in memory may serve as ideal anchor points.
Rosch and her colleagues (Rosch, 1975a, 1975b; Rosch,
Mervis, Gray, Johnson, and Boyes-Braem, 1976) have

presented the hypothesis that natural categories have

prototypical examplars which appear with consistency
across subjects, even cultures.

suggest that

very

We could additionally

large categories

(such as "large

things") may have prototypical exemplars of the extremes
as well as of the central tendencies

attributes, or whatever).

(or

most overlapping

Dimensions themselves might

act as categories and demonstrate the characteristics.
The concept of an "ideal" reference point also coincides

with the findings of Audley and
Wallis (1964). They
found a congruity effect which was
nearly symmetrical
when the background illumination
was moderate;

but when

the background was very light or very
dark, the general
advantage switched to "darker" or "lighter"
judgements.
The light background may have made the
ideal light

reference point less efficient and vice versa.

The con-

cept of ideal reference representations is
intriguing

enough to merit further investigation.
But we suggested modification and specification
of both model classes.

The present study allows con-

sideration of the semantic coding model on several
points.

First, as previously mentioned, decisions made

in this task apparently were not mediated by a temporary

data base structure.

Data structure searches which would

have produced serial position effects were definitely
not evident in this task.

It is possible, of course,

that a scaffold was used just to "hold" information in

active memory in order to provide easy access, but that
no characteristics of this storage were used to compute
a

decision.

If analog quantities were directly accessed

from a scaffold, and then compared, this would be tanta-

mount to

a

perceptual comparison, e.g., Jamieson

and Petrusic's

(1975)

model (given the necessary additions

to account for congruity)

.

It is hard to see how a code

could be generated from a scaffold
without referring
to at least the ordinal
relationships which are represented in it. But if ordinal
relationships were examined,
at least a stepsize effect as found
in transitive
in-

ference studies would be predicted.

One was not found,

and it will be argued below that
subjects were not engaging in transitive inference.
It appears safe to

suppose that more permanent semantic memory
was accessed
to perform this task.
The second specification of the semantic coding

model concerns the availability principle and the
search

mechanism which generates appropriate categorial codes
for the stimuli.

heuristic as

a

Banks

described one likely

(1977)

search for a third item which can describe

the relationship between the other two through transi-

tive inference

(Riley,

For example, if the

1976).

comparative decision were between A and

search memory to find the relationships A
then by inference decide that A
steps

(items)

>

C.

we would

C,

B and B

>

>

C,

The more ordinal

between the items compared, the greater

the number of items which could be used to make a

transitive inference; therefore, the transitive inference
search in the present task would predict an effect of

stepsize (increased step

=>

decreased RT)

,

which was
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not found.

A transitive inference should
have been

easy to perforin:

the "item between" was provided

within the context of the task itself.

Even if subjects

were not actively forming and using
listings, priming
or availability ("activation" in memory)
of the item
is represented as a magnitude rather
than by ordinal

indicators.

We might then compare these magnitude

estimates in terms of the third item,

with

bit of

a

reflection, it becomes clear that this heuristic being

proposed for the semantic coding model bears

resemblance to the reference point model!

a

striking

If we can

accept the proposition that this distance-to-a-thirditem heuristic is viable as a semantic coding explanation of performance in the comparative judgement task,
at least three questions remain:

1)

Can we discriminate

this heuristic and the reference point model?

might we use reference points?

3)

2)

Why

Are they feasible in

terms of any more global concepts of memory?

As Holyoak (1978) has noted, the distance ratio

measure is sensitive both to the sum of the distances
(actually, to each of the separate distances, which is

assumed to be equivalent) and to the difference between
them.

So it is very difficult to discover whether

"distance" relative to the reference point affects the

generation or comparison stages
or both, at least for
the reference point model.
According to that model
(as clarified by Holyoak,
1978), calculation of
the

distances to the reference point
occurs in the generation stage, and the ratio is
"set up" and estimated
in the comparison stage.
Remember, however,

that we have

assumed a continuous comparison
process on these
analog values. The most clearly
examined possibility
for this process is the stochastic
sampling procedure

proposed by Buckley and Gillman (1974);

a

counter is

incremented or decremented after each
sampling estimate
of the ratio is derived.
If the counter does
not pass

a criterion value,

another sample is taken.

The process

could require many repeated cycles through
the generate/
compare process, and thus it is unlikely that
we could

experimentally separate the two processes.

Were we able

to separate the processes, we might try to
discover

whether the comparison stage alone reflected analog
values of the stimuli.

Banks

(1977)

predicts that all

analog effects occur prior to this code-comparison

component of the semantic coding model.
The other opportunity for differentiating the

models seems to lie in their different account of the

congruity effect.

The semantic coding model predicts the

congruity effect by means of a conflict between the

linguistic comparison codes for the
stimuli and that
for the instructions.
The reference point model

attributes the effect to subjective
differences in the
actual comparison of magnitudes as computed
from

one or

the other "polar" reference points.

A means may be

developed in the future for distinguishing
between these.
One possible basis for the use of reference
points

has already been discussed.

Our concepts may be or-

ganized such that each attribute or category has

a

"best examplar" and it may be especially easy to
retrieve

these from memory to use for any number of purposes

including as reference points for estimating continuous
attributes.

Secondly, it would in many ways seem effi-

cient in terms of the long-term memory load to avoid

storing a whole range of possible attribute values with
each representative that we have in memory.
(1975)

Walker

has already produced evidence that discrete

attribute value information on at least physical properties is not stored (or not the only thing stored)

Finally, some aspect of the comparative judgement task
itself might predispose subjects to thinking in terms of

extreme or polar examples.

This could be easily checked

by searching for evidence of reference points in other
tasks where the questions and stimulus variables are more

diverse.

Rosch, for example

(Rosch, Simpson, and

Miller, 1976), has reported some
similar effects in the
acquisition of prototypical exemplars.
The concepts embodied in reference
point interpretations are quite compatible with
several global
concepts of memory. Reference point
concepts of

magnitude and dimensional knowledge are
essentially

context-dependent in that the context may
determine
the selection of the reference point or
even the form
of the magnitude information retrieved
(Holyoak, 1978).

Holographic models of memory (Cavanagh, 1972, 1976)
assume that exciting the memory representation in

a

particular manner may obtain very different results from
exciting it in another.

Some memory representations may

be responsive to only a few or one form of excitation,

and the information retrievable would be correspondingly

limited.

John (1967) has formalized this type of

memory model in neural terms.

a

Another possibility is

that memories may be stored in a primarily episodic
(Tulving, 1972; Watkins and Tulving, 1976)

form;

this

would be consistent with many notions of neural activation and retention (Hebb, 1949)

.

If there are certain

commonalities among the different episodes,
excitation pattern might activate

a set of

a common

dimensions

from several episodes or a set of activity patterns of
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any type which have occurred
in a common context,
a
pattern which is easily activated in
many contexts or
which provides the context for many
other patterns might
be equivalent to a reference point.
John
(1967)

describes the neural record, or memory,
as
pattern.

a

transient

in order for this transient
pattern to be

interpreted, it must occur over a specific
under layment
of excitation.
If the referent (context) is not
activated, the information is still stored,
but is not

"available" for processing.

Perhaps this is the parallel

to the means by which the use of reference
points allows
us to retain inconceivable quantities of information

and yet have only particular portions of that knowledge

available to us at any particular point in time and
usually only relative to a certain context.

The informa-

tion goes in in a "garbage pail" fashion (Landauer, 1975)
and is retrieved by virtue of its commonalities with

other episodes.

The abstractive nature of memory would

be an almost incidental result of such

a

system.

However we represent individual instances in
memory, we are able to compare them on any single dimension as abstract wholistic concepts.

It is not necessary

that we inspect internalized versions of perceptual ex-

perience itself.

But we do have the continuous, analog
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information available from perceptual
(and perhaps
conceptual) experience included in
the memory representation and we do utilize analog
relationships in performing memorial comparison.

FOOTNOTES
In this paper, dimension
and attribute will be

used interchangeably.

However, in general

^^"^^"^^^^ ^ill ^^fe^ to the
continuum along which
an attribute may vary, and
attribute will be used

when referring to

a

particular value on

These values may be numerical
(large +)

.

(2

tons)

a

dimension.

or ordinal

We will not consider dimensions

with nominal values (male/female) in
this paper.
^^^^Q? here is used in the sense of "not digital."
Especially, not numerical or binary, but
including

anything of continuous or non-discrete character.
This might encompass graphic forms, but is not

limited to them.

Kosslyn (1975) has suggested

undiffer entiated as

a

useful designation; there are

an infinite number of points on an undifferentiated

dimension, and each of them has meaning.
This second criterion must be applied with
cretion.

dis-

It is recognized that believableness can

be affected by many irrelevant factors including

consistency with one's political views
1959)

,

(cf.

Chomsky,

taking a flattering or unflattering view of

mankind (cf. odceson,
Bateson iy72)
^q79^

,

-,v,^
and
consistency with

common folklore (cf. Rosen,
1968).
Even the
apparently straightforward
requirement of parsimony
has been contested
1976)

(e.g., Minsky,

1975; Wicklegren,

as far too restrictive
for models of such

complex behaviors as human thought.

Nonetheless,
selecting and pursuing only the
more natural and
elegant of the myriad of available
theories
facilitates empirical evaluation,
communication,
and discussion and thus more
directly benefits
creative and productive scientific
effort.

To take this position, we must
believe that true

anomalies will consistently recur and that
any
essential details ignored in selecting unadorned
models will therefore eventually undermine
the

plausibility of those models.
Second-order isomorphism is

a

concept proposed by

Shepard and Chipman (1970); while there may or may
not be direct structural resemblance between an

individual representation in memory and the actual
object, they propose an isomorphism between the

relations among external objects and the relations
among their corresponding internal representations.
In other words,

"whatever neurophysiological events

are taking place while one
is merely irna^inina
the
external process in question-these
events have
much in common with the
internal events that occur
When one is actually perceiving
the external process
itself" (Shepard and Feng, 1972)

Image-processing models have been
referred to as
analog models (especially by
Kosslyn
and his

colleagues, e.g., Kosslyn et al

.

1977).

,

The term

used by Banks (1977) has been selected
for use in
this paper in order to clarify the
fact that there
are several analog models which do
not require

reference to an internal representation which
is
an "analog" to perception, but only
assume the use
of a continuous representation of some
kind.

Pri-

marily, the limited sense of analog only requires
that interval or ratio scale properties of the

perceptual continuum be preserved, while Kosslyn

's

interpretation requires that we be able to rerepresent
the perception in memory.

Time to make a judgement is assumed to depend

specifically on the difference between the ratio
computed and

a

set criterion.

The criterion is as-

sumed to be one in the case of unbiased decisions
(vide Jamieson and Petrusic, 1975)

.

Size may not be a unitary
dimension for real
Objects, but might refer
to length, wrdth,
thickness,
volume, or less obvious
qualities. Nonetheless,
in multidimensional
scalings (e.g., Henley,
1969)
of animals, objects, and
even countries or states,
a dimension which is
most readily interpreted as
"size" frequently emerges.
This appears to be
reflected in natural language, as
we can frequently
be heard to make remarks such
as, "Oh, his house
is bigger than ours" when
certainly we are speaking
not of the length, height, or even
volume
of the

house, but rather of general impressions
on
ness" scale.

a

"large-

Subjects evidenced no distress when

requested to "order these objects by size"

(in the

present experiment as well as that of McKinley,
1975)
For the present experiment especially,
since a

single

master list of items was used and the necessity for

relying on

a

scaling of the items was thus avoided,

it was only essential that the selected "size" order-

ing be consistently and naturally replicated by all

subjects
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APPENDIX
Analysis of variance of mean reaction
times
(four factor - collapsed across han

Source

d.f

F
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